It is widely noted that world politics suffers from a democratic deficit. 1 In a post-Cold War era characterized by globalization and deep interdependence, this deficit arises from two sources. 
legalization of world politics more generally -would be essential for global democracy. 5 Yet today, there exists twenty-three permanent, operational international judicial bodies that have issued tens of thousands of binding rulings. 6 Against this background, we examine the relationship(s) between ICs and the ongoing process of global democratization.
The core question of this article is if, how, and in which ways ICs bolster or undermine democratic values beyond the state. We contend that ICs are indeed able to advance global democratic values and shape democratic practices. They can do so by fostering equal participation, accountability, and public justification that link individuals directly with sites of authority beyond their own nation-state. We maintain that the ability of ICs to promote these values is conditioned by institutional design choices concerning access rules, review powers, and provisions regarding judicial reason-giving. We canvass these design features of different ICs and assess the promises and pitfalls for global democratization. Doing so enables us to discuss how design choices condition the practice and behavior of ICs. Although the internal democratic legitimacy of ICs is important, this article is concerned with how ICs promote the democratization of world politics at large. 7 Methodologically, we draw upon an original dataset covering the 24 ICs in existence during the post-World War II period. This dataset contains data on ICs' formal rules governing access for private, non-state actors, review powers, and judicial reason-giving. The numerical increase in ICs enables us to talk about global democratization over time while our data on design features in all 24 courts across different world regions speaks to democratization across space. The article is thus particularly novel in bridging normative theory with substantive and systematic empirical data. 8 The article proceeds in four sections. First we discuss the literature on global democracy emphasizing the recent turn toward striving for democratic values under pluralist conditions. Drawing on the current state of the literature, we outline three values that together allow us to examine the advancement or recession of global democratization. Second we underline the prevalence and importance of ICs and suggest that ICs may have a pivotal role to play in global democratization. Third we look at how equal participation, accountability, and justification are secured by different ICs and note which institutional design features are critical for each value.
We discuss both the promise and pitfalls of realizing these values by looking at how these values are realized or inhibited in practice. The conclusion discusses future directions of research by linking global democratization with debates about the legitimation of global governance at large.
Global Democratization
Work in the field of international normative political theory has flourished in recent years. 9 Roughly speaking, three separate strands can be discerned. First, global justice scholars have examined the appropriate allocation of burdens and benefits to be distributed across national borders and scrutinized how various institutional (pre)conditions trigger different moral duties. 10 Second, theorists and philosophers working in the just war tradition have examined the historical and ethical rules governing inter-state warfare and conflict. 11 Finally, global democrats have probed how the legitimacy of world politics relates to the notion of collective self-governance which stands at the heart of democratic governance within national polities. 12 This article is concerned with global democratization. The notion of a democratic deficit -in which decisions taken beyond the state pierce national sovereignty and expose individuals to rules they have not helped formulate -is now extensively recognized. 13 The global democratic deficit, tethered as it is to globalization, increased national interdependence, and the prominence of international law, has forced attention toward the normative legitimacy and sources of authority that underpin transnational social, economic, and political decision-making. While it is possible to assess the sociological legitimacy of global authority, 14 it is also clear that authoritative relationships can be legitimated through democratic practice in which the 'governed' or 'affected' parties participate in the formation of those authoritative rules which bind them.
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In order to dampen the global democratic deficit, numerous proposals, models, blueprints, and schemes have been touted to give individuals more direct say in how their lives are governed. Although a full exposition is neither possible nor necessary here, early work was often formulated in terms of idealized 'models' or 'terminal blueprints' that could be strived toward. 16 For instance, the model of cosmopolitan democracy came with a variety of short-and Equal participation means that citizens affected by the authoritative exercise of public power should have the opportunity and ability to be involved in how that authority is wielded.
This entails equal capacity to set the agenda as well as shape the rules, laws, and regulations that will affect their lives. We recognize that equality of participation may often rest upon forms of representation as individuals cannot always be directly involved in all decision-making processes. National representatives or other self-appointed representatives (interest groups, nongovernmental organizations, etc.) can all help connect individuals with sites of public power.
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Precisely how equal participation is secured will and should vary depending upon the institutional scheme in need of democratic regulation. Accountability, in a democratic sense, means that those affected by decision-making should have the right to hold power wielders "to a set of standards, to judge whether they have fulfilled their responsibilities in light of these standards, and to impose sanctions if they determine that these responsibilities have not been met". 32 This criterion gives affected individuals the opportunity to hold decision-makers at different levels of governance accountable for their actions and stop the arbitrary exercise of power which can undercut individual autonomy. Operative accountability mechanisms provide an ex ante incentive for decisionmakers to take consideration of how affected parties will react to decisions being made in their name.
Finally, public justification provides those affected by decisions with a rationale for how rules are being formulated and applied in various contexts. 33 This value derives largely from work in the field of deliberative democracy that stresses the importance of providing reciprocal and generalizable arguments for how public power is exercised and how it is connected to the public use of reasoning. 34 Reciprocity means that justification is mutually-acceptable to parties in a deliberation, whereas generalizability connotes a set of reasons that could be shared by affected parties due to shared institutional or moral structures. Public justification thus rests upon the offering of reasoned argument and, in turn, the acceptance of those reasons by affected individuals.
These values provide the basis for our analysis of how democratic practice may be instantiated and deepened beyond the nation-state. The criteria do not presuppose any specific institutional structure, indeed quite the opposite: it recognizes that the specific way different values are constructed depends on the type of institutional scheme being regulated and the diverse means available to individuals seeking democratic control over authority. 35 It is also worth discussing briefly three additional caveats. First, it is important to be clear about the composition of the relevant demos which is owed democratic standing of equal participation, accountability, and public justification. We have suggested that those individuals affected by the exercise of authority across and beyond the state are entitled to democratic rights.
This fits well with the recent work on global democratization as it tracks current scholarship on how multiple demoi of affected agents can emerge beyond the state. 37 ICs, on this view, may provide one pathway for the coalescence of demoi, and we bring out these formations in our analysis. Understanding how ICs can contribute to the formation of relevant demoi by connecting individuals to sites of public power requires sustained empirical analysis focusing on design and institutional relationships between ICs and other actors in world politics.
Second, it might also be contended that ICs are important for the legalization of world politics, but are not the appropriate institutional structures through which democratization should be promoted. It is a key point of this article that the global democratizing potential of ICs should be judged by looking at their role in the wider system. ICs can themselves be sites of authority that citizens are able or unable to participate in, but they can also curtail the authority of other national and international bodies. mapping the design of ICs, and unpacking the effects in practice we provides instructive evidence for both constitutionalists and pluralists as they seek to determine which pathway is unfolding and the related normative (i.e. democratic) potential.
The Role of International Courts
Today ICs are a prominent and influential element of governance across and beyond the state.
International courts are here defined as permanent international judicial bodies that meet the following criteria: (1) decide the question(s) brought before them on the basis of international law, (2) follow pre-determined rules of procedure, (3) issue legally binding outcomes, (4) are composed of independent members, and (5) When these various access designs are featured in conjunction, participation is heightened even further. As such, the design rules of ICs on access effects the equality of participation offered to individuals. Thus ICs can improve equal participation in a shift toward global democratization, but the mechanisms of access condition the depth and equality. 74 Moreover, while design rules condition the attainment of democratic participation through ICs, additional epistemic, geographic, and resource-based factors enable and constrain the practice of global democratization.
Accountability
ICs can also bolster the practice of accountability in global governance by safeguarding and ensuring that transnational authority is exercised according to established standards vis-à-vis affected agents. Grant and Keohane suggest that courts, including international courts, are a type of accountability mechanism. 75 We agree with this assessment and identify more specifically how they can be used to hold states and international actors and institutions to account, thus facilitating global democratization.
ICs have two types of powers that enable them to serve as an accountability mechanism in world politics and grant democratic control to affected parties. actions". 76 International administrative review is one way in which state and IO authority can be checked and protected against arbitrary decisions. Specifically, ICs with administrative review assess whether administrative decisions abide by procedural rules and correctly apply the law. In practice, international administrative review by an IC is exercised when a court declares an administrative decision to be illegal and, in some instances, requires compensation for the wronged. We are interested in both review of international and national administrative decisions as both cross-national spillovers and the authority of IOs can contribute to the global democratic deficit. However, the degree to which ICs have the power of administrative review varies. While some ICs have authority to annul both international and national administrative decisions, others have only one form of administrative review and some have no delegated administrative review.
Second, some international courts have been designed to have the power of constitutional review, or the jurisdiction to assess the validity of legislative acts. 77 Despite these pitfalls, accountability in world politics is, we argue, greater with international courts than without, and thus ICs are critical for global democratization.
Administrative and constitutional review powers are the core design features that enable international courts to offer a series of checks-and-balances on the use of arbitrary power by IOs and other state actors. Moreover, when these review powers can be initiated by individual stakeholders, as opposed to only states, the ability of an IC to serve as a democratic accountability mechanism is heightened by giving affected parties avenues to shape decisionmaking (and the interpretation of existing rules) beyond the state. This again indicates that institutional design is critical in bolstering accountability, strengthening the links between individual participation and accountability, and ensuring robust democratic practice beyond the state.
Public Justification
International courts may also contribute to global democratization through practices of public justification. As Habermas has consistently suggested, it is the public use and justification of reasoning which sits at the core of democracy. 84 A characteristic of judicial decision-making is that judges explain the reasoning of their decisions and deliver their decisions publically. Even when judicial decisions are not elaborate in their reasoning, they nonetheless specify the legal basis for their decisions. ICs are no exception. In fact, ICs are often (though interestingly not always) required by a matter of their constitutive treaties or rules of procedure to make decisions public and identify the reasons of their decisions. As a consequence of these two requirements,
ICs are uniquely positioned to bring public justification to the decisions that govern international politics.
To assess the extent to which ICs are designed to provide public justification, we draw again on our original dataset looking at ICs' formal rules on the publicity and reasoning of court judgments. Specifically, the dataset codes formal rules on: (1) whether decisions are to be delivered in a publically open session of the court, (2) if decisions are formally required to be published, at least in part, (3) whether decisions are to be reasoned, and (4) if separate 84 Habermas, Between Facts and Norms.
(concurring or dissenting) opinions can be issued by judges. 85 Figure 4 shows what percentage of ICs feature each of these various rules. Having decisions made public is only one aspect of how ICs practice public justification.
ICs, in conjunction with publically-issued decisions, give reasoned decisions. As Figure 3 shows, roughly 96% of ICs are required by formal rules to provide reasoning to their judgments. The one instance where this is not the case is the WTO AB (though the ad hoc panels are required to do so). Even without the formal requirement, however, the AB in practice does provide reasoned judgments. Reason-giving by ICs however varies in terms of quality as well as their mode and logic. In addition, ICs vary in whether separate opinions can be issued; figure 4 illustrates that half of ICs are allowed to issue separate (or dissenting) opinions.
We argue that the combination of making decisions public and explicating the reasoning of a decision advances the value of public justification in democratic ways. First, giving reasons for a decision is a device for informing the public of what the decision-maker is doing and why, while also controlling the use of discretion. When giving reasons decision-makers are "likely to make more reasonable decisions than he or she otherwise might and is more subject to public general surveillance". 86 This is similar to the notion that open deliberation generates a 'civilizing force' to avoid being hypocritical or exercising arbitrary power.
Second, the virtues of reciprocity and generalizability stand at the core of justified reason giving, especially in the deliberative democratic tradition. 87 Providing reasons which take consideration of dissenting opinions is clearly an institutional embodiment of both reciprocity and generalizability by framing decisions and arguments in terms acceptable to other parties (reciprocity) and linked with precedent or other institutional laws (generalizability Third, the reasoning offered -and the scope of judicial decisions -may also catalyze public discussion. Sunstein argues that, "case-specific judgments operate as a kind of 'remand'
to the public for further proceedings, at least in the sense that they do not foreclose those proceedings and may even spur them through the visibility of court decisions." 90 ICs are often limited to case-specific judgments, especially when their judgments are not binding on parties other than the litigants. That said, the reasoned judgments provided by courts might frame future public debates, if not public decisions.
Again, there are limitations to this value. A pitfall of court-based public justification is that reason-giving is often embedded in an inaccessible legal discourse, and thus may not always be directly intelligible for the broader public. Affected individuals are often unable to access or decipher complex legal decisions. This makes is harder for affected parties to understand the ramifications of IC decisions. As such, the broader effects of reason giving are conditioned by the public dissemination and translation of court judgments. Publically-issued decisions and publication are thus crucial to the ability of ICs to incorporate the value of public justification.
Second, the actual deliberative quality of public decisions is typically not scrutinized closely. Consequently, judicial reasoning may be shaped by strategic negotiation among judges and their own policy preferences. The requirement of reason-giving and publicity can compensate for these pitfalls, and fosters decisions that are generalizable and reciprocal. In other words, the separate elements of public justification -publicity and reasoning -offer the most democratizing leverage when taken together because publicity helps to moderate overt strategic and particularistic decision-making. Moreover, the incorporation of dissenting opinions is also critical for ensuring that arguments are subjected to the give-and-take of deliberative democratic reasoning. Given that only 50% of ICs ensure that separate opinions can be issued, though, suggests that there is much more scope and leverage for ICs to enhance global democratization. 
Conclusion
In conclusion, we make three points. and public justification, as key to the internal democratic legitimacy of ICs. Our arguments here all speak to the fact that the authority of ICs can be democratically legitimated through equal participation of stakeholders, curbing arbitrary power, and providing public reasoning for decisions. But more importantly our paper also speaks to the role of ICs in the broader landscape of global democratization, the potential role they could play in a division of labour, and the factors inhibiting realization in practice.
Finally, the article has several limitations which provide future avenues for research.
Democratically speaking, equal participation should be offered to those affected by decisions.
Although we have touched upon the issue, future work should delve into more detail about who precisely is given rights of access to ensure that those most in need of participation and representation have their interests considered. This will speak to recent literature concerned with how multiple demoi emerge across and beyond the confines of the nation state. 93 Likewise, accountability mechanisms should themselves be justified to those affected by decisions.
Moreover the deliberative quality of public reasoning by ICs should be subject to greater scrutiny. Content analysis and other quantitative measures (such as the Discourse Quality Index) 92 Bogdandy, 'The Democratic Legitimacy of International Courts '; Bogdandy and Venzke, 'On the Democratic Legitimation'; Grossman, 'The Normative Legitimacy of International Courts'. 93 Valentini, 'No Global Demos'.
